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1. Introduction 
The process of European integration is one of the most studied political phenomena since the 
second half of the twentieth century. What started as the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) which involved only six nations, has steadily evolved into the supranational entity with 
twenty-eight member states, with more states desiring to become a part of the Union. The dream 
of those that had survived the horrors of the Second World War has become an institutional 
certainty, a common market with a common currency as well as common regulation across all 
member states. Consequently decision-making has also shifted to an extent from the member 
states to the European supranational institutions: the European Commission and European 
Parliament (EP). However, a closer look at European integration reveals that this process has 
been accelerated not so much by an overwhelming desire of the European people but as the result 
of times of crises. Indeed it was the initial tension resulting from the Cold War which drove the 
establishment of the ECSC and similarly the collapse of the 'Iron Curtain' which accelerated the 
introduction of Europe's common currency, with further integration to be expected (Niemann and 
Ioannou, 2015). From this perspective the prediction made by Jean Monnet, one of the European 
project's founding fathers, that Europe will be forged through crisis seems to fit. This sense of 
optimism is premature given that public opinion towards the European project has fallen 
considerably, even more so amongst Europe's younger generations since the onset of the financial 
crisis (Guiso et al, 2014), bringing into question future European economic integration, let alone 
a political union. Looking back over the past few decades few events have given rise to the 
debate and speculation as to the state of the EU and its future to the extent the Eurozone crisis has. 
In light of this, why and how the EU and Eurozone have not contracted but strengthened and 
integrated further merits closer investigation (Ioannou, Leblond and Niemann, 2015).  
 With more and more previously domestic competences being concentrated at the 
supranational level along with decision-making, it is prudent to view the European project 
through the lens of integration. Two of the most prevailing theories on European integration 
which will be employed for the analysis of this research are neofunctionalism and liberal 
intergovernmentalism. These rival theories were specifically chosen because of their academic 
prominence resulting from their respective ability to explain further integration, which is 
expanded on in the Theoretical Framework section. Also, in light of the strict boundaries of this 
thesis, additional theories cannot be included. This thesis will examine the following research 
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question: to what extent do liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism explain EU crisis 
management policies and the resulting move towards further European economic integration? To 
answer this question, this thesis will analyse not only the economic but also the political and 
institutional factors of the crisis.   
Economic integrative steps which resulted from EU crisis management can be divided 
into three distinct categories: the creation of ESM, and steps realizing the European fiscal and 
banking unions and will be elaborated on as part of the Literature Review section. Despite facing 
the worst economic crisis of the twenty-first century the majority of Eurozone member states still 
favour the common currency. Using the Maastricht Treaty as a starting point, this thesis shall first 
provide an overview of the EU's crisis management and resulting integrative steps, focusing 
specifically on the cases selected for this thesis. Namely, on the European Stability Mechanism 
and the steps taken towards realizing the European fiscal and banking unions. This is followed by 
the Research Design section discussing the thesis methodology and hypotheses which will be 
tested. Subsequently, section five, the liberal intergovernmentalist analysis will probe core 
concepts discussed in the Theoretical Framework section, namely national preferences, 
intergovernmental bargaining and finally, credible commitment and institutional choice and how 
these concepts contribute to explaining integrative steps taken as a result of EU crisis 
management. To this same end, the neofunctionalist analysis in section six will probe the 
functional, political and cultivated spillovers focusing on the roles governmental and non-
governmental actors, in addition to supranational institutions, specifically the European 
Commission, European Parliament and European Central Bank and their contribution to the final 
policy outcomes of EU crisis management. This is followed by the conclusion and discussion of 
the empirical findings.  
 
2. Literature Review - EU Crisis Management Policies 
As noted above the financial crisis which started in the United States eventually developed into 
three crises which threatened the continuity of the European project, and more specifically the 
stability of the Euro. In their report, titled “Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union”, 
the presidents of the European Commission, the Eurogroup, the ECB and the European Council 
presented a “specific and time-bound roadmap” which “lays down the actions required to ensure 
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[its] stability and integrity of the EMU”.1 To this end, the report puts forward four integrative 
building blocks: an integrated financial framework2, budgetary framework3, economic policy 
framework4 and lastly, increased democratic legitimacy and accountability5. In other words, a 
banking union, a fiscal union and a political union. In response to, and in order to resolve, the 
Eurozone crisis, both EU and EA member states successfully implemented various reforms in 
addition to creating a number of supranational institutional mechanisms. Although the majority of 
the proposed mechanisms had already been created before the release of the December 2012 
Four Presidents report, one should view the proposed measures as being aimed at addressing the 
current as well as possible future crises. 
 
2.1 The European Stability Mechanism, Only Part of the Solution 
When confronted with the Greek exclusion from capital markets, fellow Eurozone states did not 
have a firewall to protect themselves from financial market bond speculation in May 2010. The 
immediate response by member states came in the form of the Greek Loan Facility (GLF), but, 
because this measure was created with haste, the GLF was soon replaced by a broader rescue 
mechanism, i.e. the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF).6 Yet, sovereign bond investors 
responded to the announcement of the EFSF with concern regarding its June 2013 expiration date, 
as it became clear that the EFSF's three-year time frame would not be sufficient to address the 
underlying problems in Europe's fiscal and banking framework. A sustainable and long-term 
financial assistance mechanism for Eurozone member states only came with the adoption of  
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) at the European Council meeting in December 2010. The 
intergovernmental agreement between the Eurozone's 18 member states, i.e. the Treaty 
Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, was signed on July 11th the following year. It 
came into force following German ratification on the 27th of September, 2012 and paid out its 
first loan to Spain before Christmas that same year.7 In contrast to the deemed unsuitable EFSF 
which was based on Eurozone state guarantees, the ESM has a maximum potential lending 
                                                          
1 Van Rompuy et al, 2012, 2 
2 Ibid, 5-8 
3 Ibid, 8-12 
4 Ibid, 13-16 
5 Ibid, 16-17 
6 Cody, 07 May 2010 
7 Hewitt, 29 June 2012; Minder, Kulish and Geitner, 09 June 2012 
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capacity of €700 billion. Moreover, as will be explained below, the creation of the ESM is an 
important component towards achieving  European banking and fiscal unions. 
 
2.2 Towards a European Fiscal Union 
Although it had been widely recognised before the Eurozone crisis that the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) was inadequate8, the Greek crisis and financial pressures experienced by Euro Area 
states again confirmed its ineffectiveness and inability to stabilise European public debt levels 
and financing.9 In order to resolve this, supranational fiscal co-operation and rules had to be 
strengthened. This was achieved by implementing: 1) the so-called 'Six-Pack', 2) the Treaty on 
Stability, Co-ordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG), and 3) 
the 'Two-Pack' legal mechanism. 10   
 The Six-Pack process started in March 2010 and culminated with adoption of one 
directive and five regulations in October 2011 which entered into force by December that same 
year. The adopted directive and regulations were directly aimed at reinforcing the SGP's fiscal 
surveillance. A key component of the Six-Pack is the 'reverse' qualified majority voting in the 
case of financial sanction imposition on Eurozone member states unable to bring their fiscal 
deficit and/or debt in line with the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). In other words, upon the 
recommendation of the European Commission, to the European Council, financial sanction are 
semi-automatic unless a qualified-majority of Eurozone states votes against such sanctions. By 
comparison, before the introduction of the Six-Pack, a majority was required in order to impose 
financial sanctions for non-compliance.11 A second important component of the Six-Pack is that 
European debt and deficit levels have been included specifically in the EDP, which entails that 
Eurozone countries can be placed in an EDP if their public deficit level is over 3 per cent of gross 
domestic product (GDP) and/or they have public debt exceeding the maximum threshold of 60 
per cent of GDP.12 Lastly, the Six-Pack put forward a new supranational surveillance mechanism, 
the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure, in addition to an enforcement mechanism called the 
                                                          
8 Heipertz and Verdun, 2010 
9 Cody, 07 May 2010 
10 Ioannou and Stracca, 2014; Spiegel, November 2014 
11 Leblond, 2006 
12 Feldstein, 2011, 11 
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Excessive Imbalances Procedure aimed at addressing macroeconomic disparities between 
Eurozone economies.13 
 The TSCG, also called the 'Fiscal Compact', constitutes the second step towards a greater 
European fiscal union. Building on the SGP/Six-Pack as well as the Two-Pack discussed below,  
the TSCG requires its signatories to implement a balanced budget rule into national, preferably 
constitutional, legislation. In addition, under the TSCG, member states may not incur public 
deficits exceeding 0.5 per cent of GDP and may face financial sanctions to be imposed by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) should EA member states fail to comply with this commitment 
following a ECJ budgetary review. Importantly, Eurozone countries can only receive ESM 
funding as signatories to the TSCG.14   
 The final step towards achieving a greater European fiscal union came in the form of the 
legal mechanism known as the Two-Pack which entered into force on May 30th, 2013. The two 
EU regulations of which the Two-Pack consists are aimed at enhancing the fiscal discipline of 
Euro Area countries, on the basis of Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU). The two core features of the Two-Pack are: 1) improved monitoring requirements 
for EA countries in an EDP in addition to 2) creating a common European budgetary timeline.15 
The latter feature entails a timeline during which the European Commission is required to both 
examine and provide an opinion on the draft budgetary plans of Eurozone countries before these 
are discussed in the respective national parliaments.16  
 In sum, the EU's fiscal policy measures discussed above show that how considerable steps 
have already been made to reach the objectives laid out in the Four Presidents report, particularly 
in terms of further enhancing member state fiscal discipline. Despite this, the EU is still quite a 
long way off from becoming a complete fiscal union which has a central budget. 
   
2.3 Towards a European Banking Union 
At the June 2012 European Council summit, European Heads of State agreed to move towards a 
European banking union, or in the words of the Four Presidents report, an 'integrated financial 
framework'. The five key features of financial framework are: 1) the Single Supervisory 
                                                          
13 Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012; De Santis, 2012 
14 Feldstein, 2011, 10-11; Spiegel, November 2014 
15 Spiegel, November 2014 
16 Pisani-Ferry, 2014, 110, 135, 164 
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Mechanism (SSM), 2) a single framework for EU financial regulation, 3) increased ESM 
recapitalization flexibility, 4) an individual resolution mechanism, and lastly, 5) a single deposit 
guarantee framework.17  
 Firstly, the SSM was specifically intended to sever the sovereign-bank nexus plaguing the 
Eurozone.18 The SSM, based on the TFEU's Article 127(6), entered into force in November 2014 
and consequently, the ECB has gained micro prudential supervisory authority over all Eurozone 
banks, also allowing for non-Eurozone countries to join. Secondly, the single framework for EU 
financial regulation reflects the desire of Eurozone member states to enhance the supervision as 
well as regulation of the EU's banks, which operate transnationally. At its core, this feature in 
essence sought to incorporate the Basel III banking standards into the European Union's legal 
framework, which was achieved by the adoption of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) 
next to the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) which became effective as of July 17th, 2013. 
The CRD increased the ECB's authority both in terms of sanctions and supervision, as well as 
reform national corporate governance legislation and banking risk management standards. The 
CRR was aimed at harmonizing EU banking regulations, specifically those pertaining to banking 
capital requirements. Thirdly, the ECB with the SSM's adoption is now able to directly assist 
banks facing liquidity troubles as opposed to indirectly via national governments. However, in 
June 2013 the Eurogroup decided to limit the ECB's bank recapitalization fund to €60 billion. 
This decision was made in order to ensure that European taxpayer funds would only be called on 
as a measure of last resort. Fourthly, another pillar of European banking union which 
accompanied the SSM was the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). This mechanism, which 
came into force on January 1st, 2015, applies to all banks which fall under ECB supervision and 
is funded primarily by bank levies which will be accumulated over the coming eight-year period 
through respective domestic resolution funds.19 
 Lastly, the first step towards the banking union's deposit guarantee framework was agreed 
on June 12th, 2014 in the form of the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (DGSD) and is 
aimed at harmonizing: 1) cross-border co-ordination, pan-European bank deposit insurance at 
€100.000, 3) depositor payment arrangements, and finally, 4) by harmonizing member state 
deposit guarantee schemes.  However, the European banking union's weakest link remains the 
                                                          
17 Alessi, 2012; Spiegel, November 2014; Ioannou and Stracca, 2014 
18 See Theoretical Framework section for a discussion of the 'sovereign-bank nexus' 
19 Pisani-Ferry, 2014; Spiegel, November 2014 
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deposit insurance given the fact that little advancement has been made towards adopting a single 
Eurozone deposit guarantee scheme.20  
 All in all, the Eurozone crisis has led to considerable steps in terms of further European 
economic integration, which is even more significant given the speed and scale with which 
integrative measures have been implemented. Even though the Treaty of Maastricht specifically 
stated that EU institutions, including the ECB, were not permitted to bailout its member states, 
today the EU has a framework and mechanism in place which authorises the complete opposite. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
In terms of European integration the Euro Area crisis has had a substantial impact. For many EU 
member states the crisis entailed a major economic downturn, in turn decreasing citizen support 
for further integration, and even led to mass protests against the EU's austerity measures. Some 
countries even questioned their participation in the euro area, putting at risk the survival of 
Europe's common currency. However the crisis simultaneously led to major leaps toward further 
fiscal and financial integration intended to stabilise the euro area. By setting up a banking union 
and  permanent bailout mechanism for insolvent countries, the European Stability Mechanism, 
the EU has since the onset of the crisis considerably enhanced their economic and fiscal 
surveillance capabilities.  
 From the mid-1960s with the 'empty chair crisis' we have seen how crisis and further 
European integration are closely interlinked. The signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 was 
a milestone for European integration, which resulted in the establishment of the European 
Monetary Union as well as Single Market Programme. This integrative leap forward was 
accompanied by the academic revival of neofunctionalism21 and liberal intergovernmentalism22. 
After decades of stagnation, the subsequent politicization of European integration has since then 
sparked the ascension of new theories, including the post-functionalist approach to European 
integration which focuses on public opinion and mass-level politics23. However, in light of the 
scope of this thesis, the theoretical framework shall include only the two major rival theories 
which explain European integration and its prominent assumptions. 
                                                          
20 Bordo, Markiewicz and Jonung, 2011; Alessi, 2012; Rossi, 2013  
21 Stone and Sandholtz, 1997 
22 Moravcsik, 1993 
23 Hooghe and Marks, 2009 
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3.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism: Explaining Integration 
Liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) is one of the major theories used to explain European 
integration. Created by Andrew Moravcsik through the course of the 1990s by merging the liberal 
concept of state preferences and neoliberal concepts of institutions and international 
interdependence with earlier realist theory, liberal intergovernmentalism promptly became the 
most sophisticated revision of intergovernmentalism.24 In sum, the author argues “that a tripartite 
explanation of integration – economic interests, relative power, credible commitments – accounts 
for the form, substance, and timing of major steps toward European integration”25. LI views 
European integration as being the result of rational choices made by domestic political elites 
reacting to international interdependence. 26  Integration is the result of three steps by which 
national leaders act on the incentives of international interdependence, namely the initial 
domestic formation of national preferences, the subsequent institutional bargaining which leads 
to substantive bargaining culminating with the establishment of institutions with the goal of 
securing these agreements. In short, LI contends that national preferences are formed in large part 
by the economic interests of influential domestic groups in a situation of international 
interdependence, substantive agreements reflect both the bargaining power and the range of 
national preferences, and the resulting international institutions reflect the size of the problems 
they are tasked to address.  
 Given that liberal intergovernmentalism is a theory of integration it does not offer 
specifics answers to explain the crisis directly. However, the Eurozone’s response to the crisis 
can be properly explained as being the result of intergovernmental bargaining, based on both 
diverging and converging interests of the member states, intended to stabilise and strengthen the 
common currency. Similarly, national preferences were the result of both the fiscal position of 
member states and strong interdependence within the Eurozone; despite divergent interests in 
regard to the distribution of costs for preserving the euro, preserving the common currency was 
very much a common preference amongst EA states. Frank Schimmelfenning describes this 
mixed motive situation as being a “chicken game [...] characterized by dynamics of hard 
bargaining and brinkmanship”.27 Although the negotiations succeeded in finding a co-operative 
                                                          
24 Lelieveldt and Princen, 2011, 38; Moravcsik, 1993, 1998 
25 Moravcsik, 1998, 4 
26 Moravcsik, 1998, 18 
27 Lelieveldt and Princen, 2011, 46; Schimmelfenning, 2015, 178 
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solution avoiding a breakdown of the common currency, asymmetrical interdependence meant 
that the resulting burden-sharing and, perhaps more importantly, institutional design reflected 
much more the preferences of the larger European states, primarily that of Germany. However, 
by taking a more historical perspective one can see that the original decision and design for the 
monetary union laid out in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) largely constrained the crisis 
bargaining by creating inadvertent spillovers and path dependencies. Thus the bargaining 
dynamics and outcomes were shaped by the converging preferences in favour of preserving the 
Eurozone and the endogenous interdependence which both resulted from these spillovers. 
 
3.1.1 National Preferences 
Liberal intergovernmentalist theory is based on a number of assumptions. It views governmental 
preferences towards European integration as being national and issue-specific. The direct result 
of a process of preference formation which is aimed at maximising a country's national welfare in 
relation to the issue-area in question, thus making these preferences exogenous to European 
integration. Additionally, according to LI states do not strive to achieve geopolitical power as is 
the case with realist intergovernmentalism.28 More importantly, integration preferences are the 
result of either negative or positive interdependence. Political actors will only seek further 
collective policy integration if they believe the benefits outweigh those resulting from unilateral 
national policies. LI therefore expects that integrative steps taken to address the euro area crisis to 
be based on similar perceptions on interdependence, a shared desire to avoid losses and of course 
a comparable wish to reap the benefits from further integration. 
 The nature of domestic actor preferences and interests vary depending on the respective 
issue at hand, but on issues pertaining to economic and commercial policy it can unequivocally 
be stated that domestic economic interests shape such preferences. The more “institutionally 
represented and organized”29 such interests are, the less uncertainty there exists regarding the 
cause-effect relations between individual state welfare and EU rules. On the contrary, national 
interests will be less predictable and ideological preferences more prevalent should there be a 
“weaker and more diffuse […] domestic constituency”30 combined with uncertainty concerning 
                                                          
28 Schimmelfenning, 2015, 178-179 
29 Moravcsik, 1998, 36 
30 Wallace et al, 1999, 171 
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the substantive implications of the policy choice in question. 31  According to Moravcsik 
macroeconomic policies, e.g. fiscal or monetary policy, often fail to provide straightforward 
substantive implications for interests groups compared to market-regulating rules. As such, I 
expect the macro-economic preferences of ruling governments to directly reflect their preferences 
towards integration.32 Given that the Eurozone crisis originated as financial and banking sector 
crisis before escalating into a sovereign debt crisis, and since implemented reforms comprise also 
of supranational financial market regulations, it is crucial to take business interests into account 
for this thesis. As the crisis progressed, European state and financial market interests became 
increasingly intertwined, what Schimmelfenning calls the “sovereign-bank nexus”.33 Additionally, 
the immediate welfare implications of different policy alternatives, principally the austerity 
policies, provided considerable clarity and certainty. Taken altogether, liberal 
intergovernmentalism assumes that ideological preferences will succumb to material interests. 
 The Eurozone crisis exposed the negative fiscal and financial interdependence which 
resulted from the inadequate original design of the monetary union agreed to at ‘Maastricht’. LI 
presumes that this negative interdependence creates a powerful incentive for member states to 
pursue further integration conditionally dependent on governmental confidence that such action 
would reduce national costs more so that either stagnation or disintegration. According to The 
Economist, this was very much the case at the time.34 Should the highly indebted countries have 
abandoned the common currency at the time it would almost certainly led to government default, 
a financial and monetary system breakdown, resulting in hyperinflation and no access to global 
capital markets. Most importantly, many believed this scenario would have contagion effects on 
the more solvent northern Eurozone states. Although a Greek default on its own could have been 
handled by euro countries, there was a much greater fear of financial markets losing confidence 
and withdrawing capital from other larger indebted states, including Italy and Spain. A default of 
such a large economy would have meant a breakdown of the common currency, resulting in 
currency appreciation for the remaining countries which would have led to a fall in exports in 
addition to a long-term recession.  
                                                          
31 Moravcsik and Nicolaidis, 1999, 61; Moravcsik, 1998, 468-9 
32 Moravcsik, 1998, 3 
33 Schimmelfenning, 2015, 180 
34 The Economist, 25 May 2013, 26-27 
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Yet despite a common preference to avoid non-integration costs, there is an equally 
prevalent conflict regarding the costs and terms of such integration. In order to address the crisis, 
adjustment costs could either be nationalised by means of fiscal austerity policies, in which case 
indebted member states would be forced to service their creditors themselves without external 
assistance; or mutualised through for example, fiscal equalization schemes or introducing 
Eurobonds, which would entail solvent Eurozone states paying for the failure of debt-ridden 
member states in addition to their banking systems. These factors have led to the formulation of 
the first two LI hypotheses  in the Research Design section of this thesis. 
 
3.1.2 Intergovernmental Bargaining or the ‘Chicken Game’  
Governments entering into European integration negotiations start such a process with their own 
set of preferences. Whether negotiating treaty revisions or new treaties, a unanimous agreement 
combined with domestic ratification is required by every single participating state. As such 
integration is required to be “pareto-efficient”35 in that each state should expect that the outcome 
leads to increased welfare. Depending on the issue, Pareto-efficient outcomes can vary in terms 
of the dispersal of costs and benefits between the participating states. Despite states always 
seeking to maximise their respective gains, negotiation outcomes will reflect the constellation of 
bargaining power. Intergovernmental negotiations on integration are no different. Such hard 
bargaining negotiations often include the withholding of side-payments, credible veto proposals 
as well as the formation of alternative alliances for the purpose of “excluding recalcitrant 
governments”. 36  Different bargaining power is the result of asymmetrical interdependence, 
member states which are less exposed to interdependence also have less to gain from further 
integration. As a result they have a much stronger bargaining position allowing such states to 
negotiate a more favourable outcome.  
 The hard intergovernmental bargaining hypothesis, similar to national preferences, is 
most likely to be accurate in high stake cases with clear cost and benefit distribution. To clarify, 
LI differs from other theories on European integration in two distinct way: first, it does not 
attribute an important role to supranational institutions in reaching substantive negotiation 
outcomes which may result in further integration and secondly, nor does is consider normative 
                                                          
35 Schimmelfenning, 2015, 184 
36 Moravcsik, 1998, 4 
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constraints to play an important role on bargaining.37 In the case of the Eurozone crisis, the 
mixed-motive preferences reflect a ‘chicken game’ situation, which has numerous characteristic 
features. In the first place, actors have a shared preference to avoid the costly worst case scenario, 
in this case the failure of the common currency, whilst also averting the prospect of backing 
down first. Put differently, despite non-cooperation being the least preferred outcome, actors are 
rewarded with the highest payoff for non-cooperation when other actors have made the first move. 
Although all euro area governments saw the failure of Europe’s flagship project as the worst case 
scenario, indebted countries would benefit more from waiting to be bailed out avoiding austerity 
measures being imposed on their economies. Conversely, solvent countries would most benefit 
by shifting adjustment costs to these indebted countries. Secondly, ‘brinkmanship’ in bargaining 
behaviour is also prevalent in chicken games. As actors move ever closer to brink they send 
signals of resolve to one another, making cooperative moves at last possible moment to avoid 
catastrophe. Only when the other actors act rationally does hard bargaining pay off. In such a 
scenario it is beneficial to give the impression of either incapacity or irrationality, given that both 
actors rely on their opponents’ rational cooperation. An actor can force its opponent to back 
down if it convinces its opponent of its own incapacity to resolve the situation. During the 
Eurozone crisis, solvent member states had the incentive to bring forward different political, legal 
and financial constraints in turn forcing indebted countries into making budgetary cuts up to the 
point sovereign default became unavoidable. At the same time, indebted member states were 
incentivised into stalling costly adjustment measures thereby demonstrating an incapacity to 
address financial market pressures up until the moment solvent member states realised that 
anything short of a bailout would not suffice.  
 Unless an actor is superior at signifying either incapacity or irrationality it is hard to 
foresee which side will back down in the case of a symmetrical chicken game.38 However, in the 
case of the euro area crisis interdependence was asymmetrical. Although all Eurozone countries 
were at risk, the immediate consequences of not reaching an agreement were drastically more 
severe for indebted member states which either faced unsustainably high bond rates and even 
bankruptcy in the position of Greece. This contrasts with Germany, Europe’s largest economy, 
which enjoyed substantial confidence of financial markets and would later play an essential role 
                                                          
37 Moravcsik, 1998, 54-8 
38 Lelieveldt and Princen, 2011, 232 
13 
 
in preserving the common currency in addition to any future rescue schemes. As such, solvent 
countries were in a relatively stronger position to see their integration preferences realised. 
Unfortunately, the situation could not be resolved solely by means of unilateral adjustment 
measures by indebted member states. Moreover, as an exit from the euro could not happen 
without damaging the rest of the Eurozone, solvent nations realised that a rescue plan would still 
be needed to prevent economic disaster. The combination of Germany’s financial contribution 
being indispensable and the fact that it could not viably drop the euro as its currency meant that 
the German government had little choice other than to fully commit financially to the rescue 
efforts. Taken together, these factors have led to the formulation of the third and fourth LI 
hypotheses in the Research Design section of this thesis. 
 
3.1.3 Credible Commitment and Choice 
In addition to negotiating substantive integration terms, governments also negotiate on 
institutional design. As with functionalist and neoliberal theories, nation states create 
international institutions in order to monitor as well as sanction state compliance in addition to 
securing substantive negotiation outcomes. The extent of ceding competences to such 
supranational organizations depends on how much value a state places on the respective 
substantive outcomes and issues combined with uncertainty of future actions of other 
governments. 39  Both a states’ willingness to centralise decision-making and to delegate 
sanctioning and monitoring authorities to supranational organizations depends on the issue area. 
For example, enforcement problems create incentives for states to defect unilaterally whereas 
coordination problems do not. As institutional preferences vary as much preferences of 
integration it is clear intergovernmental bargaining also impacts institutional choice. States with 
superior bargaining power tend to see their institutional preferences reflected in the final 
institutional design. 
 Because of the liberal intergovernmentalist emphasis on the functional demands of 
credible commitment, its assumptions concerning institutional choice again diverge from those of 
various other theories. LI rejects constructivist assumptions as it does not see democratic norms, 
federalist ideology nor any other standards of legitimacy and factors which shape institutional 
choice. In addition, LI also disputes supranationalism which advocates technocratic governance, 
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which is based on the necessity to centralise information and expertise.40  Lastly, the realist 
assumption that states are primarily motivated by maximizing its power41 is also not shared by LI, 
but rather that supranational solutions  
 The Eurozone crisis exposed numerous enforcement problems which existed in the design 
of the Economic and Monetary Union agreed at “Maastricht”. Firstly, the Stability and Growth 
Pact, intended to ensure fiscal discipline of member states, had already been proved ineffective 
before the onset of the crisis. Secondly, the Eurozone crisis showed how countries even with the 
absence of excessive budget deficits, notably Spain and Ireland, were unable to handle exogenous 
market shocks, consequently coming into balance of payment difficulties. Thus, the enforcement 
problem here was how to ensure member state commitment to a collective rescue plan. Lastly, 
the financial market integration component of the EMU was based on the mutual recognition 
regarding national banking regulations. The Eurozone crisis showed the inadequacies of relying 
solely on national banking resolution and supervision. The frequently comfortable relations 
between politicians and bankers in member states, regulatory arbitrage, the sovereign-bank nexus 
and liability- and burden-shifting between national regulators when multinational banks were 
concerned altogether constitute regulatory failure.42  
 Given how institutional choice during the crisis principally faced enforcement problems, 
it is only logical that calls for stricter surveillance and supranational delegation soon followed. 
But, since interdependence between Eurozone countries was asymmetric it is to be expected that 
solvent countries will use their superior bargaining power to ensure greater surveillance and 
supranational delegation in terms of fiscal discipline. On the other hand, financial transfers and 
assistance which would commit solvent countries financially should according to LI stay under 
intergovernmental control. These considerations have led to formulation of LI hypotheses five 
and six in the Research Design section of this thesis. 
 
3.2 Neofunctionalism and Spillovers: Explaining Integration 
Neofunctionalism is a theory of European integration encapsulated and summarised by the 
following five assumptions. Firstly, European integration is explained as a process, a process 
which over time evolves to adopt its own dynamic. Secondly, according to neofunctionalist 
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theory, regional integration is marked by numerous, diverse and shifting actors that build 
translational alliances.43 Thirdly, decisions are made by rational and self-interested actors that 
have the capacity to both learn from and alter their preferences based on their past cooperative 
decision-making experiences. 44  Fourthly, incremental decision-making receives primacy over 
grand designs in cases where marginal adjustments are directed by unintentional consequences 
resulting from previous decisions, as neofunctionalism assumes that political actors are unable to 
conduct long-term purposive behaviour due the fact that decisions on European integration are 
usually made relying on imperfect knowledge regarding the consequences in addition to being 
made under pressure.45 Fifth and lastly, neofunctionalism views the community setting exchanges 
not as supranational style decision-making but rather positive-sum games in which the actors 
seek to achieve compromises which upgrade common, not individual, interests and in which 
actors avoid unconditionally vetoing proposals.46 
 Neofunctionalism's conception of change is concisely captured through the concept of 
spillover. In general, the three main types of spillover, which will all be employed by this thesis, 
are 1) functional, 2) political, and lastly 3) cultivated.47 
 
3.2.1 Functional Spillover 
Functional spillover pressures occur when only further integrative steps can ensure the 
achievement of an original objective.48  The source of functional spillover development is the 
interdependence of issue areas as well as policy sectors. Issues and sectors are likely to be 
interdependent in contemporary economies and political arenas to the extent that it becomes 
challenging to isolate them.49  Internal interdependencies are inherent to functional pressures 
within or related to the European project, which prompt further integrative steps by policy-
makers to enable the achievement of an original objective. Due to these intrinsic task linkages,50 
political actors cannot adequately address issue A without addressing issue B and possibly issue 
                                                          
43 Wiener and Diez, 2009, 48 
44 Haas, 1958, 291; Wiener and Diez, 2009, 48 
45 Haas, 1970, 627 
46 Wiener and Diez, 2009, 49 
47 Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991, 1-5; see also Niemann, 2006; Lelieveldt and Princen, 2011 
48 Lindberg, 1963, 11 
49 Wiener and Diez, 2009, 49-50 
50 Nye, 1970, 804 
16 
 
C.51 A good example which exemplifies the reasoning behind functional spillover dynamic is the 
construction of the European Single Market, which would ensure free movement of labour, 
capital next to goods and services. In order for European member states to establish an internal 
market they needed to harmonise regulations and standards amongst them. Moreover, the new 
single market would also mean the removal of border checks which would require harmonization 
of immigration and policing policies. Furthermore, given that the European single market would 
lead to increase in transnational commerce, domestic economies would become vulnerable to the 
pressures associated with increase currency fluctuations. In order to address these financial risks 
as well as the costs of growing trade, the European Monetary Union was a functional and logical 
requirement to protect member state economies as well as strengthen the single market.52  
 During the ensuing academic debate the possibility that the potency of functional 
spillover logics are not dependent on the extent of policy area interdependence. Rather two 
specific aspects determine the degree to which functional pressures have an impact on actors. 
Firstly, if functional dissonances are not resolved through additional integrative steps, this could 
lead to either shocks or crises which subsequently amplify function pressures which in turn shall 
likely spur required integrative steps. Secondly, an actor's behaviour cannot predictably be 
determined by existing functional structures. Actors must consider the functional logic either 
compelling  or plausible in order for the logic to develop.53 Put differently, how actors perceive 
functional logic determines its strength. An indicator for this may be the development and 
persuasiveness of functional logic within the political discourse of decision-makers. If functional 
spillover rationales are present in the discourse of decision-makers, they are likely to be 
expressed by means of political decisions.54 Using such modifications of the functional spillover 
concept should allow for improved understanding of the impact functional pressures have on the 
EU policy process. Taken together, these factors have led to the formulation of the first NF 
hypothesis in the Research Design section of this thesis. 
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3.2.2 Political Spillover 
While functional spillover places its emphasis on European integration’s more technical 
characteristics, political spillover entails the process by which actors, i.e. governmental elites, 
political parties or interest groups, conclude that a problem cannot be properly addressed at the 
national level. This should accompany a steady “learning process” which leads to national elites 
shifting their political activities, expectations and allegiance in the direction of a new European 
centre. 55  In other words, the political spillover process is fundamentally one of “adaptive 
behavior” the result of sectoral integration.56 As a result, domestic elites are expected to promote 
further integrative steps contributing political incentives to the supranational integration process. 
Specifically, neo-functionalist political spillover stresses the importance of the role of individual 
national leaders.57  
 However, Haas (1958) was focused mainly on non-governmental elites and their exertion 
of pressure, in particular trade unions and associations,58  yet neofunctionalist academics later 
changed this focus to include a wider range of interest groups.59 These organizations are believed 
to expose existing functional interdependencies which exist between policy area operating mainly 
on the supranational level. Two prominent examples of European interest groups are the 
European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) and BusinessEurope.60 Both these interest groups 
advocated in favour of the Single Market during the 1980s and subsequently, its expansion into 
Central and Eastern Europe following the fall of the Berlin Wall, citing the economic benefits of 
an expanded and more integrated single market. As such, the supranational interests and 
expectations of such interest groups do not also always  align with the interests of domestic 
actors.61  
 In addition to the learning process discussed above, Niemann and Schmitter (2009) 
amongst other academics, highlight the importance of “socialization processes”, i.e. as the 
interactions between EU institutions and national officials becomes more intensified, this leads to 
fostering of consensus amongst the various national agents.62 Haas (1958) suggests that this 
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desire for consensus points to the supranational problem-solving mentality of national agents 
which consequently entails that rather than vetoing against undesirable proposals, national agents 
prefer to find a compromise thereby satisfying common interests.63  In sum, neofunctionalist 
political spillover assumes that both political elites and non-governmental actors favour further 
integration should they perceive such supranational integrative steps and policies as beneficial in 
terms of serving national interests. These factors have led to the formulation of the second NF 
hypothesis  in the Research Design section of this thesis. 
 
3.2.3 Cultivated Spillover 
The cultivated spillover pertains mainly to the role of supranational institutions, which are 
focused predominantly on augmenting their own authorities and influence, and their desire to 
become agents of further integration given the fact that these institutions would most likely 
benefit from such developments. However, once these supranational institutions are created they 
often proceed to adopt a mission of their own resulting in the actors that established these 
institutions losing control over them. Such institutions may indeed foster further integration by 
for instance adopting the role of policy entrepreneurs or a position of authority within the 
European project's political system thereby increasing their capacity of influence the relational 
dynamics between the myriad of different types of actors.64 
 A means by which EU institutions promote collective interest is through  “package deals”, 
which according to Lelieveldt and Princen (2011) entails the binding of different policy issues 
into a single legislative item during intergovernmental negotiations. 65  By putting forward 
package deals, EU institutions emphasise the need for member states to support one another in 
different policy areas, making individual concessions yet often securing supranational interests.66 
The cultivated spillover logic assumes actors act rationally during such intergovernmental 
negotiations. According to Tranholm-Mikkelson (1991), supranational institutions, serve national 
interests and bargaining positions through such package deals allowing intergovernmental 
negotiations  to exceed the lowest “common denominator” and to serve the greater collective 
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interest, often consequently expanding supranational mandates and authority. 67  These 
considerations have led to the formulation of the third NF hypothesis in the Research Design 
section of this thesis. 
 
4. Research Design 
The dependent variable in this thesis is the extent of European (economic) integration resulting 
from EU crisis management policies, specifically those taken in the period 2010 to 2012, 
concerning the following cases: the European Stability Mechanism, as well as integrative steps 
regarding the fiscal and banking unions. The independent variables are the core liberal 
intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist concepts, succinctly encompassed in the nine 
hypotheses laid out below. The aim of this thesis is to find causal relations between the 
independent and dependent variables by means of process-tracing analysis of EU crisis 
management policies discussed in the Literature Review section.  
 
4.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
As stated in the introduction, this thesis seeks to answer the following central research question: 
to what extent do liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism explain EU crisis 
management policies and the resulting move towards further European economic integration? 
On the basis of the integrative steps and considerations brought up in the Literature Review and 
Theoretical Framework sections, the following six liberal intergovernmentalist hypotheses have 
been formulated for this thesis: 
H1: EU member states prefer increased European integration over maintaining the status 
quo or  disintegration if such action prevents welfare losses in the case of negative 
international interdependence.  
 H2: The national preferences of EU member states are shaped by their own fiscal position: 
  i) Indebted member states will favour a mutualised adjustment; 
  ii) Solvent member states will favour a solution based on national adjustment. 
H3: Intergovernmental bargaining during EU crisis negotiations involved both 
brinkmanship  and hard bargaining. 
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 H4: Solvent member states will ultimately financially rescue indebted member states, but 
 on the condition that they shape the terms of such a rescue package. 
 H5: The resulting reformed or newly created institutions increase member state 
 commitment credibility to euro area stability. 
H6: Supervision of EU institutions is less intergovernmental than EU institutions which 
provide financial assistance. 
In light of the integrative steps and considerations highlighted in the Literature Review 
and Theoretical Framework sections, the following neofunctionalist hypotheses have been 
formulated which shall be examined by this thesis: 
H7: The functional spillover will influence intergovernmental bargaining during EU crisis 
negotiations given: 
i) original goal salience; 
  ii) existing functional interdependencies created by the original EMU framework; 
  iii) absence of plausible policy alternatives. 
H8: The political spillover logic assumes non-governmental actors will favour further 
economic integration to resolve the Eurozone crisis. 
H9: The cultivated spillover logic assumes that EU institutions will favour addressing 
existing EMU shortcomings. 
 Section five will analyse the degree to which LI can account for EU crisis management 
measures which resulted in further economic integration, particularly of Euro Area member states, 
during the course of the Eurozone crisis. In turn, section six of this thesis, the neofunctionalist 
analysis, will analyse the degree to which NF spillover concepts explain why EU crisis 
management resulted in further economic integrative steps. 
 
4.2 Process-Tracing and Case Studies 
In order to test the hypotheses derived from the respective theories explaining European 
integration, this thesis will employ process-tracing in order to identify causal chains and 
mechanisms between the outcome of thesis’s dependent variable and the independent variables.68 
Moreover, this method allows this thesis to take into account equifinality, i.e. numerous causes, 
allowing for analysis of alternative explanations which lead to the same result, further economic 
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integration.69 The liberal intergovernmentalist analysis of the Eurozone crisis shall utilise core 
concepts elaborated on in the Theoretical Framework section, namely national preferences, 
intergovernmental bargaining in addition to institution-building. Although the LI analysis will 
focus on the negotiations and integrative steps taken to resolve the crisis it will not do so in 
chronological order but shall instead focus on the height of the Eurozone crisis and introduction 
of the European Stability Mechanism, amongst other major integrative steps, between 2010 and 
2012 during the apex of the crisis. This process-tracing analysis will rely predominantly on 
official documents pertaining to integration outcomes and newspaper articles, as well as  
scholarly literature on the topic. The findings will be contrasted with the other theories employed 
in this thesis in order to evaluate which offers the best explanation for European integration 
during the Eurozone crisis.   
 The neofunctionalist analysis of the Eurozone crisis shall utilise core concepts elaborated 
on in the Theoretical Framework section: functional, political and cultivated spillovers and how 
these contribute to explaining integrative steps undertaken during the crisis.  Functional spillover 
analysis shall focus on European Heads of State and their role as governmental elites. Given the 
scope of this thesis, the analysis of political spillovers will focus on non-governmental elites, 
specifically the role of interest groups, notably the European Roundtable of Industrialists and 
BusinessEurope, and that of financial markets during the Eurozone crisis. The cultivated spillover 
analysis will focus on the most significant supranational institutions in the context of the 
Eurozone crisis: i) the European Commission, ii) the European Parliament, and the iii) European 
Central Bank.  
 
5. Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Crisis Management 
As outlined in hypotheses one and two, liberal intergovernmentalism expects the Eurozone crisis 
to lead to mixed state motives. On the one hand a strong common interest to avoid financial 
catastrophe and preserve the euro based on interdependence and diverging preferences regarding 
the distribution of adjustment costs based on the member states’ fiscal situation. 
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5.1 National Preferences 
From the onset of the crisis Eurozone member states have been committed saving and reinforcing 
the common currency, a commitment strengthened by  both the existing negative interdependence 
as well as prohibitive costs. Both solvent and indebted countries indicated from the start that 
giving up the euro was not an option. Both Greek Prime Minister Papandreou70  and German 
Chancellor Merkel vowed to “stabilize the euro” 71 and that “Greece will be the first and the last 
case of its kind”72. Both Chancellor Merkel and Finance Minister Schäuble openly defended the 
rescue plan for Greece, the latter emphasising that “[w]e must defend the stability of the common 
European currency”73. Minister Schäuble concluded that the costs of a Greek default outweigh 
that of any rescue plan, comparing the case with the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy which 
accelerated the 2008 financial crisis.74  To this end, both politicians declared the Greek rescue to 
be “alternativlos,” meaning the absence of alternative solutions.75  Likewise, French President 
Sarkozy argued that if “we created the euro, we cannot let a [Eurozone] country fall,” reaffirming 
French support for both the common currency and the Greek bailout.76 By 2012, EU Heads of 
State, notably Chancellor Merkel, 77  Italian Prime Minister Monti and newly elected French 
President Hollande continued to (publicly) stress their commitment to preserving and 
consolidating the euro area. 78  
 Although there was little dissenting opinion on defending the euro, a series on the crisis 
by Peter Spiegel of the Financial Times revealed how Greek EA membership was not always as 
unwavering. 79  Reportedly, Minister Schäuble, at the peak of the Eurozone crisis, lead the 
“infected leg camp” of various advisors and policy-makers which saw a Greek exit from the euro 
as essential to both save and strengthen the common currency. This starkly contrasts with the 
“domino camp” which feared the effects of “Grexit,” specifically the uncertainty for the markets 
but also the contagion for other Eurozone states which could have led to further undoing of the 
common currency. Although Chancellor Merkel decided to prevent the risky Grexit, the debate 
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on such a core policy highlighted how Germany’s preferences were by no means unitary or 
internalised. Rather, they were the result of the high uncertainty and negative interdependence 
calculations.   
 Although Eurozone states ultimately agreed on preserving and strengthening the euro area, 
there were conflicting preferences on the means by which to accomplish this target. Supported by 
Finland, Austria and the Netherlands, Germany sought to decrease their financial assistance and 
liabilities. That which made these countries independent from external assistance was their high 
credit ratings and solvency. When Germany reluctantly committed itself to the Greek bailout in 
early 2010, it received support from the Finnish, Austrian and Dutch governments.80 At the time, 
the German government had rejected capital raising by the Commission and Eurobonds, preferred 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance and strengthening the SGP by introducing 
automatic sanctions including voting rights withdrawal, and a procedure for sovereign default as 
well as excluding countries that breach the rules.81 By 2012, Germany continued this stance by 
opposing further expansion of the EFSF, the creation of a supranational European bank fund in 
addition to direct bank recapitalization.82 
 During this time, the preferences of Germany and France could not have been more 
divergent. From the start of the crisis, France took a position in favour of actively addressing the 
Greek debt crisis along with seeking to rein in the financial markets. Moreover, with the support 
of Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain and Belgium, France opposed automatic sanctions for indebted 
member states and called for soft adjustment policies as well as the “Europeanization” of 
sovereign debt.83 What characterised these member states was their shared fiscal and economic 
position: less prosperous, higher debt, and facing considerable financial market pressures. Thus it 
was in the self-interest of these states to push for added liquidity with little to no conditions 
attached. To achieve this, France and its southern Eurozone coalition pushed for direct 
recapitalization of European banks, bank licenses for both the ESM and EFSF, expansion of these 
European rescue funds, authorizing the ECB to purchase bonds, and for the Commission to raise 
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capital by introducing Eurobonds – whilst at the same time rigidly opposing automatic sanctions 
and strict austerity measures.84  
 Overall, state preferences during the euro area crisis can be adequately explained by 
liberal intergovernmentalism. All Eurozone countries pushed for deeper economic integration to 
resolve the present and potential negative interdependence brought on by the crisis. However, the 
terms of integration differed considerably depending on the member states’ fiscal position, 
although France only partially fits this pattern.85 Amongst the ‘southern coalition’ France was the 
most economically and fiscally stable state, having a triple-A credit rating and bond yields 
slightly higher than that of Germany, at the beginning of the crisis. However, by early 2010 
French bond yields fell due to the contagion effects resulting from the Greek crisis which put 
increased pressure on its relatively overexposed financial system.86 French preferences could 
therefore be the result of emerging and anticipated economic vulnerability. Explaining the stark 
differences in French and German preferences requires, in addition to analysing material 
conditions, taking into account the conflicting economic philosophies of both France (Keynesian) 
and Germany (Ordoliberalism).87 
 In spite of changing issues and government constellations, intergovernmental preference 
groups remained consistent during the course of the crisis. Although the French presidency 
changed from Sarkozy to Hollande in May 2012, French crisis policy remained largely consistent 
despite Hollande being critical of the Fiscal Compact and strongly favouring the introduction of 
Eurobonds.88 Furthermore, all issues since the start of the crisis: from the initial bailouts and 
rescue funds, budgetary and monitoring reforms, to the advancement of the European banking 
union, all were shaped by the existing Eurozone coalitions. On one side, indebted states favouring 
less financial regulation and stronger pan-European commitments, in contrast to solvent countries 
preferring restricted financial commitments alongside stricter supranational financial and fiscal 
supervision thus confirming the first two LI hypotheses. 
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5.2 Intergovernmental Bargaining 
A closer look at the euro area crisis reveals an abundance of evidence for hard bargaining and 
brinkmanship behaviour by Eurozone member states. Highly indebted member states followed a 
pattern of emphasising impending disaster and stressing their institutional incapacity thereby 
attempting to force solvent creditor states into bailing them out. Additionally, these states initially 
delayed or blocked attempts of solvent states to impose strict conditions upon rescue packages, 
seeking to limit or avoid negative reactions from their respective domestic constituencies. This 
contrasts with solvent member states, for example Germany, which initially sought to delay or 
reject making financial commitments referring to domestic political obstacles, specifically public 
opinion and the Deutsche Bundesbank 89 . However, facing the imminent Greek default and 
conceivably the common currency, Germany and other solvent states agreed to keep indebted 
states afloat. Spiegel’s euro area crisis assessment, based on interviews with various decision-
makers between late 2011 and 2012, bears similarity to the chicken game metaphor discussed 
earlier. Interviewees, ranging from “mid-level bureaucrats to prime ministers,” provide an 
unsettling narrative of near misses and “foolhardy brinkmanship,” despite prevailing in the end at 
saving the euro.90 
By mid-March 2010 negotiations of the first Greek bailout had reached its boiling point. 
Germany refused to make concrete commitments, advocating unilateral austerity measures 
besides threatening to exclude other indebted countries from future bailouts, albeit as a “ultima 
ratio”.  However, within a week Germany changed its position and redefined its ‘last resort’ as 
the granting of credit to indebted member states which no longer have access to the capital 
markets, yet when Greece asked for capital assistance in April 2010 the German government 
again delayed taking action.91 It was only when the financial markets began speculating against 
other weakened states with downgraded credit ratings, fearing a chain reaction, that all Eurozone 
states agreed on the €110 billion bailout as well as the creation of the EFSF. Although 
unconfirmed, President Sarkozy supposedly threatened to leave the negotiations and even to 
abandon the common currency, according to Spanish sourced at the negotiations, should 
Chancellor Merkel disagree with the proposals.92 Merkel’s alleged retort was, in addition to also 
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suggesting a German euro-exit, to demand stripping the voting rights of Eurozone countries 
unable to meet their commitments. Although Merkel’s spokesman dismissed these claims the 
next day as being “not plausible,”93 and even though the threats possibly made by both parties 
ultimately proved inconsequential, the negotiations as a whole were characterised by hard 
bargaining methods. 
As to the brinkmanship of other indebted countries, governments were hesitant to request 
capital assistance from the ESM or the EFSF with the goal of avoiding both damage to their 
reputation as well as the strict conditionality which accompanied such loans. Before Spain 
accepted a bailout and restrict foreign control over its banking sector, it was reluctant to act for 
weeks before succumbing to the increasing financial pressure. 94  Similarly, when the Irish 
government intended to reach out to the EFSF in November 2011 Irish Prime Minister Cohen 
actively blocked its efforts.95 The negotiations between the EU and Cypriot government in 2013 
endured for months. With the first agreement rejected, the second was only accepted by the 
Cypriot government after the ECB threatened to cut off financial support entirely, despite Prime 
Minister Anastasiades threatening resignation and to also drop the euro.96    
However, in October 2011 the worst case of brinkmanship happened as Greek Prime 
Minister Papandreou announced that the bailout plan would be voted on through a national 
referendum. Papandreou did this in hopes of forcing both dissenting ranks within his own party 
as well as opposition leader Samaras into supporting the plan, thereby consolidating his 
government’s position.97 Unfortunately, the market response to this announcement was to send 
Greek and Italian bond yields rising steeply pushing the euro area closer  to collapse. In response, 
Merkel and Sarkozy, at the G20 summit in Cannes, gave Papandreou the ultimatum to either stay 
in the euro and receive continued financial assistance, or to allow his referendum.98 Soon a 
national unity government replaced that of Papandreou, supporting the bailout package and 
cancelling the referendum. The G20 meeting did, however, fail to find a solution to the escalating 
crisis as Italy continued to reject attempts to place it on an IMF programme. Citing Bundesbank 
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opposition, Merkel in turn rejected EFSF replenishment with newly available IMF ‘special 
drawing rights’99.100 
The latest major chapter of the euro area crisis took place during the first half of 2012 
when Chancellor Merkel changed her once uncompromising opposition towards an expanded 
ECB role as a “lender of last resort”. At the Los Cabos G20 summit in June Merkel still rejected 
Italian Prime Minister Monti’s plan which would authorise ECB bond-purchasing, albeit only for 
rule-abiding Eurozone states suffering from financial market speculation.101 During the European 
Council meeting which followed the same month, Spanish Prime Minister Rajoy and Monti 
cautioned their fellow European Heads of State that they would not last much longer with the 
current interest rates.102 In the face of the developing ‘Bankia’ crisis and Spanish and Italian bond 
yields continually rising, Germany came to see its initial vision for the euro area - no bailouts and 
rescue funds, shared debt, and for some politicians, also no Greece - as unattainable. However, 
although Germany ended up supporting the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) 
bailout programme, it shaped the final outcome ensuring that shared burdens fall under 
centralised control.103  
As was expected of European crisis decision-making, solvent member states, notably 
Germany, in return for dropping opposition to bailout programs for indebted states were able to 
prescribe the terms of integration. Solvent states prevented Eurobonds and other mutualised 
sovereign debt from being introduced, ensuring that debt remained national and that any financial 
assistance would be provided through a system of credit including IMF involvement. As a result 
solvent states were able to successfully reject attempts by indebted member states to grant bank 
licenses for the ESM and EFSF. Furthermore, Germany successfully pushed for strict austerity 
conditionality be attached to financial assistance which strengthened national budget monitoring 
and sanctioning capabilities of the EU,104 plus the implementation of the Fiscal Compact which 
contained a ‘balanced budget rule’ which if possible would be enshrined in the constitutions of 
Eurozone states. Yet, not all German proposals found support, most notably automatic sanctions 
and voting right suspension in the case of excessive budgetary deficits. However, the threat of 
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revoking voting rights was, according to an undisclosed observer, intended to serve as Germany’s 
bargaining chip in order to achieve its more realistic targets discussed above.105 
 All in all, there is ample evidence which supports the third and fourth LI hypotheses 
pertaining to brinkmanship, hard bargaining and the dictation of rescue package terms by solvent 
euro area countries, most notably Germany. Firstly, hard bargaining during the crisis negotiations 
included leaving the common currency, voting rights suspension, and even threats to let indebted 
countries default on their obligations. Next, brinkmanship is apparent by both indebted countries, 
which sought to avoid strict loan conditionality, and solvent states, Germany and its allies, which 
continuously delayed and avoided committing to rescue packages for insolvent southern countries. 
The final outcome in terms of integration most closely reflects the preferences of the Eurozone 
member state with the greatest bargaining power, Germany. In return for German commitment to 
rescuing indebted states, other Eurozone states agreed to do so in accordance with German 
preferences. Secondly, intergovernmental negotiations led to the main reform and crisis 
management deals being reached, including the EFSF, ESM, the Fiscal Compact as well as EU 
budget monitoring and banking union guidelines and procedures. Although the European 
Commission brought forward various policy proposals and initiatives recommending 
supranational reforms, their success depended on whether they reflected the preferences of 
solvent euro area states. Although the banking union proposal, albeit slightly modified taking 
German concerns into account, succeeded, a noticeable failure for the European Commission 
came with the rejection of the Eurobonds proposal. Lastly, despite the important role played by 
the ECB by buying euro area governments more time to find a long-term solution for the crisis, 
the institution’s agenda-setting role has not changed despite considerable institutional reform, 
discussed in the section below.  
 
5.3 Credible Commitment and Choice 
Throughout the course of the Euro Area crisis, institutional reforms and institution-building were 
motivated either by avoiding – or strengthening – credible commitments. Material preferences 
were an important factor in setting member state institutional preferences.  
Solvent countries wanted to bolster the credibility of insolvent states’ pledge to monetary 
discipline whilst limiting their own fiscal commitments. This accounts for Germany’s preferences 
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for placing fixed limits on the lending capacity of European intergovernmental bailout funds.106 
Although Eurobonds and supranational funds advocated by insolvent states would definitely have 
bolstered Eurozone state bailing out commitment credibility, it would have also resulted in less 
control and greater costs for solvent states. Then again, German proposals pushing for balanced 
budget rules into member state constitutions as well as strict and automatic sanctions for member 
states which violate the excessive deficit rules were intended to reinforce the credibility of the 
SGP and Excessive Deficit Procedure rules which had been severely lacking since the 
introduction of the common currency. To this end, Germany was willing to endow Europe’s non-
majoritarian supranational institutions, the European Court of Justice and the European 
Commission, with additional enforcement and monitoring capabilities. Proposals for the banking 
union also included both commitment-avoiding as well as commitment-enhancing preferences. 
While strongly supporting supranational supervision for European banks despite initial attempts 
to exclude a number of German banks, Germany did oppose a supranational recovery mechanism 
supported by a pan-European fund, dreading the prospect of large capital transfers to member 
states with unstable banks. 
On the contrary, indebted states focused on bolstering the credibility of solvent country 
commitments towards resolving the euro area crisis whilst limiting their own commitment to 
budgetary discipline. Hence, these states preferred supranational bailout solutions which could 
not be blocked by solvent country vetoes given that such a system would not require a separate 
intergovernmental agreement each time a member state would face acute financial challenges. In 
addition, these countries opposed Germany’s proposed automatic sanctions for budgetary and 
fiscal non-compliance preferring more flexibility and fearing domestic backlash from its 
constituencies. Preferences towards the banking union also directly conflicted with that of solvent 
countries, i.e. they opposed supranational banking supervision and preferred creating a 
supranational recovery fund and mechanism.  
Nonetheless, Eurozone member states had a shared interest in establishing institutions 
which would improve credible commitments to the euro and stabilizing the euro area, despite 
having differing institutional preferences. The three main institutional reform efforts agreed to by 
Eurozone countries directly correspond with the three economic calamities, the financial crisis, 
the sovereign debt crisis and the institutional incapacity to counter loss of market confidence, 
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which together led to the euro area crisis. The Fiscal Compact and monitoring legislation aimed 
at ensuring member state budgetary compliance were implemented to address existing SGP 
enforcement problems, banking union legislation addresses the sovereign-bank nexus and 
enforcement problems created by having an integrated financial market supervised by national 
regulators, and lastly, the ESM resolves the issue of solvent member states having to directly 
bailout indebted states. Although these institutions do reflect the shared interest to increase 
credible commitment to the common currency, the final design of these institutions match 
German preferences, indicative of Germany’s dominant bargaining power. Indeed, supranational 
intergovernmental monetary assistance, financial and economic monitoring, and the 
establishment of a banking union, which provides supranational banking supervision, indicate 
Germany’s dominance during the crisis negotiations. Firstly, the Board of Governors of the 
European Stability Mechanism reaches decisions based on unanimity. When both the ECB and 
Commission determine that the stability of the Eurozone is threatened because the ESM failed to 
provide financial assistance, emergency voting procedure still requires an 85 per cent voting 
share, hence large member states effectively have veto power. Secondly, the Commission now 
has a greater role regarding supranational surveillance of member state fiscal and economic 
policies: an enlarged role in budgetary planning of euro area countries, resulting in more stringent 
balanced budget oversight allowing for timely implementation and credibility of sanctions for 
noncompliance. In the context of enforcement, member states now require a qualified majority to 
reject, rather than adopt, a proposal by the Commission, i.e. reverse qualified majority voting. 
Lastly, although the ECB is now authorised to directly supervise system-relevant banks, the 
resolution mechanism still retains both national and intergovernmental features. Specifically, 
bank resolution decisions are still made by an autonomous board of national authorities, as 
member state finance ministers can overturn any such decisions, and the mutualisation and 
accumulation of the fund is to be realised within eight years. 
In sum, liberal intergovernmentalist expectations do match the fifth and sixth LI 
hypotheses. The concerns towards the euro area stability and the credibility of member state 
commitment is reflected in the undertaken institutional reforms. Though the final design of the 
supranational and intergovernmental institutions corresponds closely with solvent member state 
preferences, particularly those of Germany. Although the competences of Europe’s supranational 
institutions have increased as a result, this should not be seen as counterfactual to liberal 
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intergovernmentalism. Rather, they are the result of solvent country preferences, having the 
greater bargaining power vis-à-vis indebted states, who wished to address the existing 
enforcement problems discussed above.   
 
6. Neofunctionalism and Crisis Management 
The neofuctionalist analysis section of this thesis shall analyse, in the following order, functional, 
political and cultivated spillover in the Eurozone crisis management in line with expectations of 
hypotheses seven, eight and nine.  
 
6.1 Functional Spillover and Political Actors 
The extent to which functional spillover logic influenced intergovernmental bargaining outcomes 
during EU crisis negotiations is examined below. Moreover, neofunctionalism’s spillover concept 
allows for the examination of both governmental and non-governmental actor influence towards 
EU crisis management outcomes next to the role of EU institutions.  
 
6.1.1 Original Goal Salience 
An original policy objective, whether significant, urgent or both, is necessary in order for 
functional pressures to develop. In the context of the Eurozone crisis and the integrative measures 
taken in response, there has been a constant and salient objective, namely preserving the stability 
of the European Monetary Union in turn safeguarding the single currency. All, if not most, euro 
area member states together with EU institutions supported this fundamental objective.107  This 
objective is of course, in turn, closely related to the more fundamental goal of securing the Single 
European Market (SEM), as confirmed by key policy-makers including Spanish Prime Minster 
Rajoy108 and German Finance Minister Schäuble.109 Moreover, some have argued that the EMU 
and SEM represent policy objectives critical to the entire European project, succinctly captured in 
German Chancellor Merkel's statement: “The euro is the guarantee of a united Europe. If the 
euro fails, then Europe fails.”110 Overall, the original objectives can undoubtedly be considered 
salient. 
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6.1.2 Functional Policy Interdependencies 
As elaborated on in the Theoretical Framework section, functional interdependences between 
different policy areas can account for why an original integrative goal, specifically the aspiration 
to achieve it, can lead to integration in a different policy area. In the context of the Eurozone 
crisis, steps towards deeper European economic integration were taken in order to address 
functional pressures leftover from the incomplete financial architecture created by the Treaty of 
Maastricht.  
 According to Niemann and Ioannou (2015), “functional interdependencies are based on 
the multitude of policy areas that are conducted in parallel and interconnected over different 
time horizons.”111 What is important in this process is that policy, in accordance with the EMU 
design laid out in the Treaty of Maastricht, has been spread over various levels of government, as 
opposed to a single level. Although fiscal policies remained a predominantly national affair, 
exchange rate and monetary policy became an exclusively supranational EU competence 
following the introduction of the single currency. In addition, financial market regulation was 
both a national and supranational competence, whilst financial market supervision and also 
structural policies, which extend beyond the SEM, largely remained at the national level. As such, 
three functional dissonances which created further integrative pressures during the Eurozone 
crisis have been identified.  
 The first functional dissonance is evident from the intergovernmental fiscal, budgetary as 
well as structural policies and supranational monetary policy, leading to negative externalities. 
Although these externalities were supposed to be addressed by the SGP, the Maastricht Treaty's 
non-bailout clause in addition to sparsely coordinated European structural policies, it became 
clear that this framework was insufficient as it incentivised free riding behaviour. Moreover, 
insolvent euro area countries found themselves with few policy options to address the financial 
market pressure on their sovereign debt during the Eurozone crisis given the fact they could, for 
example, no longer adjust their nominal exchange rate.112  The subsequent crisis management 
solutions, for example the ESM or the economic and fiscal framework improvements, addressed 
the functional dissonances between the non-bailout clause and a stable common currency and the 
decentralised national economic policies which brought on public over-indebtedness.  
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 The second functional dissonance was that the EMU depended on national authorities for 
supervision of national financial institutions which operated within Europe's single financial 
market, despite the fact that these national credit institutions made cross-border investments 
(leaving themselves exposed) and/or were “systematically important”. 113 Although the 
introduction of the single currency brought with it extensive financial market integration,114 
resulting in the financial markets and EU banking sector growth, supervision of these sectors 
remained a principally national competence which is even more troubling given the lack of 
sufficient institutional adjustments.  Put differently, the constrained supranational European 
institutional framework and financial public policy did not align with the new single financial 
market and the subsequent Europeanization of the EU banking sector. This functional dissonance, 
which materialised between national fiscal policies, financial integration and stability, gradually 
became unsustainable.115  Measures taken to diminish these functional dissonances stemming 
from this “functional trilemma” included the creation of the European banking union, yet the 
underlying baking system still functioned primarily in accordance with national policies which, 
according to Schoenmaker (2011), allowed for the build-up of private over indebtedness.116  
  The third functional dissonance is the 'sovereign-bank nexus' which resulted from the 
interaction between the two previous dissonances discussed above.117 Whether because national 
governments were forced to recapitalise systematically important financial institutions or because 
these institutions were overexposed to failing sovereign debt, both private and public debt on the 
national level became increasingly interconnected. These two closely corresponding 
developments between bank and national debt had negative implications for European financial 
stability, concurrently disrupting the supranational monetary policy. As such, the sovereign-bank 
nexus threatened both Eurozone and EU-public goods, i.e. the single currency and financial 
stability, necessitating emergency countermeasures at both the supranational and national levels. 
The combined creation of both fiscal protection mechanisms, e.g. the EFSF and ESM, and the 
establishment of a centralised supranational resolution and supervisory framework were aimed at 
relieving functional pressures which emerged during the Eurozone crisis.  
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6.1.3 Eurozone Crisis: Amplifying Existing Functional Pressures 
If existing functional pressures are left unresolved by additional integrative steps, this can lead to 
future crises which in turn can, as a result of the crisis management process, cause additional 
functional pressures thereby required further integrative steps. This process was apparent after the 
introduction of the common currency in 1999. However, because a generally positive economic 
climate accompanied the monetary union during its first few years, the absence of sufficient 
integrative pressures meant that these, largely unnoticed, existing functional pressures were left 
unaddressed. Nonetheless, because these functional dissonances remained unaddressed, this 
allowed even prominent Eurozone member states, such as Germany and France, to neglect the 
SGP’s fiscal rules as early as 2003.118 Moreover, it failed to prevent the accumulation of financial 
imbalances and reduced the competitiveness of several Eurozone economies which failed to 
provide balanced fiscal and structural policies consistent with supranational monetary policy. 
Therefore, the first two discussed functional dissonances can to a certain extent be credited with 
amplifying the Eurozone crisis.119  
 The escalation of functional pressures during the Eurozone crisis was the result of lacking 
crisis management measures in the institutional framework agreed at “Maastricht”. This directly 
led to the third functional dissonance as indebted member states had to bailout insolvent domestic  
financial institutions to preserve financial stability.120 The Eurozone crisis revealed to European 
authorities the fact that they did not have the capacity to address the sovereign debt crisis’s 
negative downward spiral. Specifically, the absence of a supranational fiscal mechanism meant 
that European authorities could not, yet, resolve the effects of the financial crisis.121 Ultimately 
European leaders were able, by taking further institutional integrative steps, to relieve the 
functional pressures brought on by the crisis. This was done by introducing supranational 
regulation, supervision and resolution measures for financial institutions, and by taking collective 
action harmonizing European, and Eurozone, economic and fiscal policy and procedures 
coordination to secure future financial and economic stability.   
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6.1.4 The Absence of Plausible Policy Alternatives 
If an original policy objective, in this case preserving the common currency and EMU stability, 
cannot be achieved by non-integrative means, it is expected that functional spillover logic will be 
strong. Numerous alternatives to the original policy objective were probed, ranging from 
maintaining the status quo, to creating a core EMU or splitting the common currency into a 
northern and southern euro, to a complete policy reversal entailing the dissolution of the single 
currency and the reintroduction of respective national currencies.122 This thesis argues that these 
alternative options were considered by European decision- and policy makers as too 
economically and politically costly, as well as that path dependencies point towards a different 
solution. 
 Firstly, the Eurozone crisis credibly proved that retaining the status quo was a 
nunsustainable option. Secondly, the different spillback scenarios too were considered to be 
financially detrimental given that reversing the transition from national currencies to the common 
currency and accompanying monetary policy would be too costly resulting in “sunk costs” for 
both member states and corporations. 123  Moreover, as raised above, the EMU had created 
interdependencies between Eurozone countries due to the integration of financial markets. As a 
result, dissolving the EMU or even allowing for the exit of a single Eurozone country would have 
resulted in considerable political and economic risks and costs. Consequently, all members of the 
euro area collectively supported the preservation and strengthening of the Eurozone in its 
entirety.124 Despite the expression of dissenting opinions in domestic political arenas,125 these 
were in most cases heavily criticised by ruling governments. By and large, top euro area policy- 
and decision makers rejected these alternatives.  
 
6.1.5 Functional Logic in Political Discourse 
As raised in the Theoretical Framework section, actors need to accept functional logics as either 
urgent or plausible before these can substantially unfold. The Eurozone crisis, having amplified 
existing functional pressures, seems to have fostered learning effects thereby resolutely fortifying 
the functional logic. Even though the dynamic of the functional spillover stemming from the 
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EMU was first raised by the Delors Committee in 1989, 126 it failed to gain traction until the 
Eurozone crisis in political discourse.  
 As the Eurozone crisis protracted, political discourse soon became filled with functional 
spillover rhetoric. This was evidently the case with representatives from both EU institutions and 
the respective Eurozone member states. During the crisis the functional link between the common 
currency and the single market was repeatedly brought up. European Council President Van 
Rompuy “If the eurozone’s integrity would not be preserved, one should not take the continued 
functioning of the internal market for granted.” Adding “I will personally do my utmost to keep 
the 17 and the 27 together.”127 Chancellor Merkel similarly reasoned that in order to secure both 
the common currency and single market, “[w]e will have to give up powers to Brussels.” 
Moreover, to guarantee the future of the European project, the EU must become develop “into a 
fiscal union and then a political union.”128 
 Regarding the single currency’s resulting functional consequences, European leaders have 
also progressively employed functional spillover logic in their argumentation. Commission 
President Barroso stated that it was a mistake to pursue the “common currency and single market 
[whilst relying on] national approaches to economic and budgetary policy”129 whose opinion was 
echoed by the 2012 Four Presidents report.130   
 European and national decision-makers proceeded this discussion by citing the functional 
link between the EMU and a potential yet vaguely described political union.131 In addition to the 
four Presidents and Chancellor Merkel, also French President Hollande agreed with the logic 
looking towards future reforms that “this eurozone must take a political dimension.” However, 
Hollande added that such an integrative step would first have to be preceded by a “fiscal union, 
the banking union, [and]  the social union.”132 Unsurprisingly, the preposition that a political 
union would logically follow the introduction of the common currency was not perceived as 
uncontroversial by some segments of the European Parliament and Commission. This notably 
included European Commissioner for Competition Joaquín Almunia who stated, after 
recognizing the legitimate right of member states to pursue their own national interests, that “at 
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the end of the day, individual nations need to do what is necessary in order to save Europe.” For 
Commissioner Almunia this necessity also included a “right to push for a political union after 
having achieved the economic and monetary union.” 133  The logical result of this political 
discourse on functional constraints are the integrative steps taken towards the establishment a 
supranational integrated financial framework.134 Interestingly, those whom one would expect to 
argue in favour of retaining national sovereignty, namely politicians of national governments, 
also agreed with the functional logic. For example, British Chancellor of the Exchequer Osborne 
stated that a European banking union was always considered to be an essential requirement to 
ensure “a more stable single currency for the Eurozone.”135 
 In light of ample evidence presented above, it is clear that during the Eurozone crisis 
functional logic received widespread acceptance in political discourse of both national and 
European policy-makers. This confirms that as the crisis progressed, functional pressures became 
increasingly convincing to European political elites. Given that a decision-maker’s political 
options tend to be restricted by such discourse,136 it is logical to assume that such discourse shall 
also be evident with subsequent political decisions of the same scale. 
 
6.2 Political spillover and Non-Governmental Elites 
As mentioned in the Research Design section, in light of the scope of this thesis the analysis of 
the concept of political spillover shall focus purely on the role of non-governmental elites. This 
analysis shall first proceed with the role of interests groups during the Eurozone crisis, before 
discussing the role played by financial markets. 
 
6.2.1 Europe’s Interest groups 
The political spillover concept shall be probed by examining the extent to which 1) interest 
groups perceived supranational solutions as beneficial, 2) interest group representation took place 
via overarching Brussels-based organizations and/or was coordinated transnationally, and 3) 
determining the resulting impact of these interests groups on European decision-makers.  
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 Firstly, overall business leaders have reacted positively regarding the extent to which 
supranational solutions have been beneficial in resolving the Eurozone crisis. The survey data on 
Eurozone business leaders in the 2013 International Business Report concluded that 78 percent 
view joining the euro as positive,137 94 percent support saving the common currency,138 and, 
importantly, 89 percent of Eurozone business leaders also support additional economic 
integrative steps.139 Moreover, the assortment of business interest group statements, reports and 
position papers corroborate business leader interest in European supranational solutions to the 
crisis.140 According to Jäger (2013), economic interest groups, specifically those representing 
corporations significantly involved in “intra-currency union trade” are inclined to support the 
single currency as it reduced transaction costs given the eliminated exchange rate risks associated 
with different national currencies.141  
 Secondly, and in accordance with neofunctionalism, the majority of business interest 
representation has gone through overarching Brussels-based organizations and/or was 
coordinated transnationally. For instance, on the eve of the June 2011 European Council summit 
which would vote on additional Greek bailout funds, a broad coalition of 50 top French and 
German business representatives, representing annual turnover surpassing €1.5 trillion and 
employing over five million workers globally, launched an advertisement campaign entitled “The 
euro is necessary” in which it called on European leaders to provide additional financial aid to 
Europe’s indebted countries.142 Moreover, in 2011 the Eurozone’s three biggest business interest 
groups, the Italian ‘Confindustra’, the French ‘MEDEF’ and German ‘BDI’, delivered a joint 
statement in which they called for European leaders to both preserve the euro and push for deeper 
economic integration.143 In addition, the campaign to stabilise the single currency also included 
substantial involvement from the European Roundtable of Industrialists, an influential interest 
group which seeks to increase competitiveness in the European Union, which in this case strongly 
encouraged the strengthening of the EMU’s framework. 144  Furthermore, Europe’s largest 
business interest group, BusinessEurope, has throughout the course of the Eurozone crisis 
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indisputably and uninterruptedly supported these objectives, 145  whilst also taking collective 
action together with other European financial and industrial interest associations.146 
 Thirdly, ascertaining the exact degree to which these interest groups had an impact on 
European decision-makers is quite challenging, as evidenced by academic studies into the 
position of EU interest groups.147 However, it is clear that the interest groups discussed above 
have during the crisis had meetings in person with key European decision-makers. On 10 May 
2011, Gerhard Cromme, the initiator of the Franco-German media campaign, together with 
several German business leaders met in person with Chancellor Merkel to discuss their concerns 
over the troubled state of the single currency. 148  During the fall that same year, ERT 
representatives respectively met with French President Sarkozy, European Council President 
Thorning-Schmidt and again with Chancellor Merkel to discuss their Eurozone crisis 
management proposals aimed at deepening the EMU’s framework.149 
 More concretely, when examining the different legislative packages which advanced 
integration one can definitely discern the influence of interest groups. Particularly with the ‘Six-
Pack’ which was created to consolidate procedures which addresses macroeconomic imbalances 
and public debt reduction. During and preceding the Six-Pack negotiations, available evidence 
implies that BusinessEurope played a role of policy entrepreneur as several proposals first put 
forward and advocated by the interest group found its way into the final legislation. Examples of 
this include adopting stronger binding sanctions, including increased automatism as well as the 
streamlining of fine transfers towards the crisis resolution fund, weeks before these were raised 
by the European Council task force or the European Commission.150 Although there is no direct 
evidence confirming that efforts made by BusinessEurope and other interest groups led to the 
inclusion of these provisions in the final legislative package by either the  Council's task force or 
the Commission, the timing and context of the legislative proposals together with the direct 
interactions between BusinessEurope and EU and national decision-makers next to the four 
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letters sent directly to the European Council President Van Rompuy151 do suggest at the very 
least that these interactions were conducive towards the final legislative outcome.  
 Following the announcement of the Six-Pack legislative package, BusinessEurope openly 
relished the fact that a number of their policy recommendations had been adopted, particularly 
regarding its envisaged stern budgetary targets,152 which is rather significant given that interest 
groups are generally inclined to downplay their level of influence.153 Moreover, BusinessEurope 
continued to play the role of policy entrepreneur promoting economic governance reforms which 
would later be adopted as part of the Fiscal Compact given that the interest group, in its European 
Action Plan released in 2010, already proposed stronger fiscal rules and the reinforcing European 
supranational institutions, notably the ECB, to guarantee long-term member state budgetary 
discipline.154   
 In sum, the pressures of the Eurozone crisis provided business interest groups with an 
excellent opportunity to advocate further integrative steps which would stabilise the single 
currency and reinforce EU economic governance.155 Preceding  the December 2011 EU summit, 
BusinessEurope alongside other interest groups had promoted three big policy proposals: firstly,  
voting rule alteration which would make overruling Commission deficit recommendations by the 
European Council more difficult, secondly, an increase in EU member state commitment to enact 
necessary national reforms, and lastly, making ESM loans conditional upon the ratification of the 
TSCG.156 Again, elements of the final legislative framework of the TSCG, which was signed in 
March of 2012, closely resembles Business Europe's original proposals.157  
 
6.2.2 Europe’s Financial Markets 
Even though financial markets have been considered mere arenas wherein different actors pursue 
their own individual strategies interacting solely with each other,158 they are largely considered 
by academics to be actors during the course of the Eurozone crisis.159  
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 As is suggested by hypothesis eight, this thesis argues that financial markets acted during 
the Eurozone crisis, both indirectly and directly, to promote further economic and financial 
integration. Although financial markets did not organise themselves as a single unitary actor 
during the Eurozone crisis, given the high degree of market uncertainty as well as the prevailing 
display of herd-like actions,160 their behaviour appeared in the eyes of EU policy- and decision-
makers as being unitary and as a result had a significant impact on EU crisis management forcing 
the acceptance and implementation of further integrative measures. 161  Specifically, financial 
markets not only highlighted the functional dissonances which existing the EMU's original 
framework, but in turn posed a significant threat to Eurozone stability through its drastic credit 
and economic risks re-evaluations. According to Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012), financial 
markets perceived delays and hesitation by EU policy-makers as undermining to the credibility of 
financial guarantees, which only served to increase the risk of member state debt default.162 As a 
result, considerable funding pressure arose in a number of Eurozone sovereign debt markets, 
which led to an unsustainable rise in borrowing rates. Particularly problematic for highly 
indebted countries, the increase in interest rates for freshly issued national debt securities led to 
further costs for financial unstable member states adding further  pressure on EU budgetary 
deficits. This combined with downgraded creditworthiness of numerous Eurozone states 
generated a disastrous and economically unsustainable cycle of rising interests rates and 
sovereign debt, almost forcing fragile Eurozone states into bankruptcy.163 
 In light of these developments and given the potentially devastating economic 
consequences of allowing Eurozone member states to default, EU policy- and decision makers 
had no option but to address the situation. These risks and necessity of immediate action first 
became apparent at the emergency Euro summit on May 7th 2010164 and according to Ludlow 
(2013), the financial market pressures by and large set the tone of the negotiations. For example, 
when Cypriot President Christofias request a few days to think over the new European bailout 
measures, Chancellor Merkel declined it immediately citing the importance of reaching an 
agreement before financial market reopened the next week.165 Fortunately an agreement was 
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reached in time to create a supranational stabilization mechanism.  This decision by the 
Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) would be the first in a series of integrative 
steps taken to address financial market pressures. Although the policy measures adopted in May 
2010 prevented in the short-term the onset of a European financial crisis, they fell short of 
preventing financial market speculation which targeted the sovereign bond rates of indebted 
Eurozone countries. 166  Thus, not only did financial pressures persist following initial crisis 
management policy measures, they increased in scale consequently forcing EU policy-makers to 
consider more far-reaching reforms to the EMU framework. Over the course of the many 
summits, EU decision-makers repeatedly sought to convince Europe's financial markets of their 
capacity to resolve the seemingly dire economic situation, before eventually adopting durable 
integrative solutions including the Fiscal Compact, the Six-Pack, as well as banking union 
reforms.167 Of the three integrative solutions, the Fiscal Compact is particularly interesting when 
analysing the role of financial markets. By the fall of 2011 it became apparent that the integrative 
measures which were taken in response to the Eurozone crisis proved insufficient to resolve 
existing financial market pressures. Consequently, as Greek sovereign bond yields and ECB 
overnight borrowing in December 2011 rose to record heights, this set the tone for the subsequent 
European Council summit negotiations. In addition, on the eve of the summit EFSF chief 
executive officer Regling spoke to European investors reassuring them that the summit would 
lead decrease the financial instability of the Eurozone, which in turn added additional pressure on 
the summit participants as they would have to convince financial markets that measures adopted 
at the summit were indeed sufficient to stabilise the Eurozone and remove the functional 
dissonances present in the initial EMU design.168  
 In sum, the existing functional dissonances increased the need for EU policy- and 
decision-makers to enact reforms which would replace governance by the markets with 
governance by member state governments, leading therefore to the creation of mechanism 
designed to stabilise the European Monetary Union.169 Through the lens of neofunctionalism, 
European financial markets became the indicator of the extent to which functional pressures had 
been resolved. If the markets perceived Eurozone crisis management measures to be insufficient 
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or EU policy-makers failing to realise sustainable institutional reforms, they would respond 
negatively increasing the financial pressure on European sovereign bonds. Conversely, if such 
integrative measures were perceived as sufficient financial markets would respond positively.170 
 
6.3 Cultivated Spillover and EU Institutions 
Regarding the role played by Europe’s supranational institutions in furthering integration during 
the euro area crisis, those institutions most significant are i) the European Commission, ii) the 
European Parliament and the iii) European Central Bank. These three institutions all favoured 
taking further integrative steps to resolve the Eurozone crisis and, overall, without their 
involvement the integrative process would not have gone as far as it has. 
 
6.3.1 The European Commission 
In terms of cultivating spillover pressures throughout the crisis, the Commission played a 
comparatively limited role. Hodson (2013) surmised that during the early years of the crisis the 
Commission did little to push for, or even arrange ideas and proposals supporting further 
integration. This can be explained by the agreed crisis management solutions, i.e. the ESM and 
EFSF, being largely intergovernmental, thus restricting the European Commission’s right of 
initiative.171  However, during the Fiscal Compact negotiations, the Commission successfully 
positioned itself on the ‘winning side,’ i.e. Germany and its allies, yet failed to realise its interests 
whenever those preferences diverged from those of Germany and its partners. The Commission 
did, by stressing functional spillover rationales, incentivise solutions which would further 
European integration.172 Once European Heads of State had reached an accord authorizing further 
integrative steps, the Commission adopted a much more proactive role. Most notably and perhaps 
ambitiously, the Commission successfully put forward two legislative proposals which would 
eventually form the two pillars on which the banking union would be based, namely the Single 
Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). Although these 
proposals were met with considerable scepticism from some Euro area countries,173 the European 
Commission ended up with additional competencies and increase authority to undertake 
                                                          
170 Vilpišauskas, 2013, 371 
171 Hodson, 2013, 301-314 
172 Barroso, 2011, 4 
173 European Commission, 2009; Chaffin, 12 September 2012;  
44 
 
autonomous action through its role in the new SRM  and given the surveillance procedures which 
accompanied the Six- and Two-Pack as well as the Fiscal Compact. 
 
6.3.2 The European Parliament 
The EP did contribute substantially in terms of cultivating spillover pressures throughout the 
crisis, even playing an important role in areas where it lacked a mandate to do so. During the 
EFSF, ESM and Fiscal Compact negotiations, the EP was cast aside as European governments 
opted to reach intergovernmental agreements. Still, the EP was continuously critical of each step 
taken which side-stepped the Community framework174 and as a result of this pressure, it was 
decided to link both the ESM, and in time the Fiscal Compact, with the Treaties by means of 
revision circumventing the ratification process required for new treaties.175 Regarding the Six-
Pack negotiations, the EP successfully pressured the European Council into preventing that 
supranational legislation proposals would be attenuated. For example, concerning the 
Commission’s future role, it succeeded in limiting the role of member states by securing a greater 
level of procedural automaticity thus preserving the position of the Commission. Despite that the 
European Parliament only had co-decision rights on four of the six legislative proposals in 
question, MEP’s successfully persuaded the Council to negotiate the legislative package in its 
entirety with the EP.176 The same was done during the SSM negotiations, when the EP in effect 
gained co-decision rights alongside the Council on SSM regulation by allocating supervisory 
competencies to the ECB again by treating these regulations as an intrinsic regulatory component 
of the European Banking Authority (EBA). Lastly, although the EP had no intention of 
strengthening the competencies of Europe’s supranational institutions, it did seek a proportionally 
greater accountability role in the context of the new institutional solutions. 
 
6.3.4 The European Central Bank 
Compared to the European Commission and the EP, the ECB received by far the most attention 
during the course of the crisis. One of the main challenges for the ECB was to ensure euro area 
price stability despite uncertainty concerning its monetary policy.177 More specifically, the ECB 
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had to address fears regarding euro reversibility next to preserving financial stability. Its 
monetary policy measures, both standard and non-standard, included: key interests rate reduction, 
collateral policy changes, in addition to its Long-term refinancing operations.178  During the 
course of the crisis this came to include the 2012 Outright Monetary Transactions which 
succeeded the 2010 Securities Market Programme (SMP) and was aimed at “safeguarding an 
appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of the monetary policy” through 
securities purchases in secondary markets179, and three ‘covered bond purchase’ programmes.180 
Regarding the non-standard monetary policy measures, although some claimed that the ECB had 
surpassed its competences,181 others claimed the ECB did too little by not acting as a “lender of 
last resort”.182  
 Aside from the implementing its monetary policy measures, the ECB from the start of the 
crisis advocated further integration of the EMU through its role in the 2010 Van Rompuy Task 
Force, its legal opinions on legislation pertaining to the EMU, its interactions with respective 
financial authorities in forums including the European Council and the Euro group, but also 
through its contribution to the 2012 Four Presidents report.183 Due to the interconnectedness of 
EMU policy domains, the ECB was also able to play a role in designing and subsequently 
monitoring supranational economic adjustment programmes, albeit in an advisory capacity.  
  Perhaps the most evident case in which the ECB advanced its integration preferences was 
during the negotiations on the banking union. Already preceding the euro area crisis did the ECB 
have a proactive standpoint towards encouraging greater financial integration,184 which would 
during the crisis translate to its preferences towards increased monetary policy transmission 
efficiency in the context of the banking system. Hence the ECB strongly favoured the creation of 
the SSM next to its role as single supervisor, despite not being “the only solution, [it was] the 
only practical one” given the circumstances.185 Additionally, the ECB supported the SRM seeing 
the potential emergence of further functional dissonances should supervision not be tied together 
with an effective supranational resolution mechanism. 
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 In line with Traynor (2012), appeals to further strengthen and integrate the EMU’s 
institutional architecture by the ECB were warranted given its responsibility to secure the 
stability of the common currency.186 Other observers have even argued that the ECB’s stance is 
partially the result of policy paralysis brought on by the non-bailout clause of the Maastricht 
Treaty187 in addition to weak political leadership.188 According to Alessi (2012), it was the slow 
response on the part of European Heads of State during the crisis that led to the ECB, being the 
only institution “capable of intervening promptly and decisively,” 189  to exceed its initial 
mandate.190  
 In the end, the ECB’s encouragement towards not only adjustment but also deepening of 
the EMU framework can be explained by neofunctionalism as the resolving of functional 
dissonances amid the diverse policy domains underlying the EMU which risked not only the 
ECB’s independence but also its capacity to protect the euro and provide price stability. The 
ECB’s independence came under pressure in May 2010 at the onset of Europe’s sovereign debt 
crisis, when French President Sarkozy in effect demanded a bailout from ECB President Trichet. 
In response, Trichet warned that the Governing Council of the ECB would react unfavourably to 
such pressure in light of the potential “catastrophic consequences” for Eurozone stability.191  
 Observers differ in their perception of the ECB’s behaviour at the time, with some 
describing it as entirely regular,192 or a failure to act,193 which Yiangou et al. (2013) view could 
have led to deeper integrative steps being undertaken.194 Schmieding (2012) builds on this by 
concluding that the ECB was willing to let financial pressure accumulate, as such pressure 
incentivises politicians to enact difficult and often unpopular reforms to help stabilise their 
economies. 195  Moreover, De Grauwe (2011) suggests that this approach by the ECB has 
effectively forced euro area members to establish the ESM. 196  In sum, the ECB cultivated 
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spillover pressures during the crisis through its proportionate monetary policy actions as well as 
through its encouragement towards a deepening of the European Monetary Union.197  
 
7. Conclusion 
The goal of this thesis was to answer the following research question: to what extent do liberal 
intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism explain EU crisis management policies and the 
resulting move towards further European economic integration? Overall, the two  major theories 
which explain European integration both succeeded in this respect, as empirical evidence was 
found for all hypotheses, albeit to different degrees, derived from these theories were supported 
in the analysis of Eurozone crisis management and subsequent integration outcomes. This 
conclusion shall examine the liberal intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist findings before 
proceeding with a discussion of the implications of the thesis findings for further research.  
 The analysis of national preferences reflected the existing negative interdependence in 
addition to the fiscal position of Eurozone member states, with the partial exception of France 
being as an outlier, thus confirming the first and second hypotheses. Eurozone governments 
agreed to pursue further integration to resolve the widespread negative interdependence with the 
aim of preventing additional costs which would have accompanied the fall of the single currency. 
However, member states all sought to reallocate as much of the adjustment costs as was possible 
to other Eurozone countries. What resulted from the existing preference constellation was a 
chicken game scenario which entailed a joint preference to stabilise the Eurozone, whilst at the 
same time willing to risk its implosion in order to reduce member state adjustment costs. 
 In line with the hypotheses three, through six, intergovernmental bargaining involved both 
brinkmanship and hard bargaining. The newly created or reformed institutions and policies 
created to stabilise the Eurozone combined banking regulations, financial assistance and 
surveillance with increased credible commitment of euro area states to also enforce the new rules. 
Notably, both the design of the newly established or reform institutions as well as the terms of 
Eurozone stabilization by and large reflected the preferences of Germany, the member state with 
the greatest bargaining power during negotiations.  By accounting for the both the outcomes and 
features of EU negotiations at such a crucial phase in the European project's development, liberal 
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intergovernmentalism reaffirms its capacity to explain important steps which lead to further 
European integration.  
 However, as is correctly pointed out by critics, although liberal intergovernmentalism is 
most effective in explaining isolated intergovernmental negotiation processes, it does fall short of 
accounting for the internal dynamics of European integration process, in other words how 
contemporary integration decisions are determined as a result of previous integrative steps and 
subsequently created path-dependencies. Significantly, the shared preferences of Eurozone states 
to both preserve and stabilise the single currency next to their willingness to credibly commit to 
institutional reforms can perhaps best be explained the earlier integrative step which created the 
single currency in the first place.198  Confronted by the unforeseen negative costs of partial 
economic integration in addition to becoming aware of the negative interdependence which 
resulted from the previous decision to join the European Monetary Union left Eurozone states 
without a fall back option,  these countries were to an extent forced to accept the new institutions 
and rules, which they had previously rejected during the EMU negotiations preceding the Treaty 
of Maastricht. However, had the global financial crisis occurred before the creation of the EMU, 
it is unlike member states would have agreed to such measures. This is evident and supported by 
the fact that non-Eurozone countries have generally chosen to not commit themselves to the 
various supranational reforms which have been introduced during the course of the crisis. As 
such one can irrefutably conclude that further economic integrative steps taken during the 
Eurozone crisis is determined predominantly by the choice member states made over twenty 
years ago. In addition, as the severity of the Eurozone crisis fades so too shall intergovernmental 
bargaining as has been evidenced by liberal intergovernmentalist analysis. This is illustrated by 
the fact that Germany in the context of the banking union's legislative process, has already been 
forced to make concessions given the slow but steady return of institutional reform to customary 
legislative procedures, i.e. European Commission initiatives and European Parliamentary co-
decision. 
 The Eurozone crisis has shown that liberal intergovernmentalism is best applied to 
intergovernmental negotiations as it successfully captured the process by which member states 
negotiate based on the diverging preference and interdependence  arrangements. Moreover, 
liberal intergovernmentalism has shown that, despite the context of path-dependent integration, 
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that asymmetrical interdependence, different national preferences and bargaining power remain 
crucial towards explaining European integration.  
 In terms of analysing integration during the Eurozone crisis, neofunctionalism has 
contributed considerably to understanding of the process. Specifically, neofunctionalism 
recognised numerous important factors and mechanism driving change. From this theoretical 
perspective, Eurozone crisis management led to integrative outcomes which addressed three key 
functional dissonances which resulted from the EMU's incomplete framework established by the 
Treaty of Maastricht, but were based on the shared salient policy objectives of protecting the 
single currency and EMU stability. The neofunctionalist analysis of this thesis has shown that 
these three dissonances triggered the Eurozone crisis, which consequently enlarged these 
functional dissonances. The functional spillover dynamic, given the lack of plausible alternative 
options, increased substantially and as a result played an important role in shaping political 
discourse of EU policy- and decision-makers. Besides the functional pressures, EU institutions 
also sought to assert integrative pressures, as shown by the ECB's assertiveness in advocating 
further integrative crisis management solutions designed to address the EMU's governance 
shortcomings as well as by the EP's policy entrepreneurship throughout the Six-Pack negotiations. 
Moreover, interest groups provided additional integrative pressures as they generally also 
favoured additional economic integration as a solution to the Eurozone crisis. What is even more 
important is the role played by financial markets, given the uncovering and exposing of 
functional dissonance in addition to reprimanding decision- and policy-maker inactivity or when 
deciding that proposed integrative solutions were insufficient.  
 An important theoretical limitation is evident from the neofunctionalist analysis above, 
specifically the focus of integration dynamics fails to explain the limitations of European 
integration. An example of this includes the fact that neofunctionalism cannot adequately explain 
why Eurozone countries have to-date not reached consensus on the introduction of fully 
supranational fiscal union in light of the lack of disintegrative pressures. Nonetheless, the 
continued relevance of neofunctionalism is evident by is analysis of the Eurozone crisis, given 
the continued potential for spillovers due to the lingering functional dissonances, suggests  that 
there is significant potential for further research as a result of the analysis and findings presented 
by this thesis.  
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